2016年考研英语阅读材料:The euro zone

　　JUST a few months ago the euro zone's leaders believed that, having weathered the storm, they were set fair at last. Buoyed by the promise of Mario Draghi, the president of the European Central Bank, to do “whatever it takes” to support the currency, confidence had seeped back into the continent. Growth seemed to be returning, albeit at a slow pace. Troubled peripheral countries were recovering, after bail-outs and painful measures to cut budget deficits and improve #petitiveness. Unemployment, especially among the young, was still desperately high, but at least in most countries it was falling. And bond spreads had narrowed sharply, as financial markets stopped betting that the euro would fall apart.

　　It was an illusion. In recent weeks the countries of the euro zone have begun to take in water once again. Their collective GDP stagnated in the second quarter: Italy fell back into outright recession, French GDP was flat and even mighty Germany saw an unexpectedly large fall in output (see article). The third quarter looks pretty unhealthy, partly because the euro zone will suffer an extra drag from Western sanctions on Russia. Meanwhile, inflation has fallen perilously low, to around 0.4%, far below the near-2% target of the European Central Bank, raising fears that the zone as a whole could fall prey to entrenched deflation. German bond yields are hovering below 1%, another harbinger of falling prices. The euro zone stands (or wobbles) in stark contrast with America and Britain, whose economies are enjoying sustained growth.

　　What started more than four years ago as a banking and sovereign-debt crisis has decayed into a growth crisis that is now enveloping the three biggest economies. Germany is teetering on the edge of recession. France is mired in stagnation. Italy's GDP is barely above its level when the single currency came in 15 years ago. Since these three countries account for two-thirds of euro-zone GDP, growth in places like Spain and the Netherlands cannot make up for their torpor.

　　The underlying causes of Europe's new ills are three very familiar and interrelated problems. First, there is a shortage of political leaders with the courage and conviction to push through structural reforms to improve #petitiveness and, eventually, reignite growth: the big countries have wasted the two years bought by Mr Draghi's “whatever it takes” #mitment. Second, public opinion is not convinced of the urgent need for deep and radical changes. And third, despite Mr Draghi's efforts, the monetary and fiscal framework is too tight, throttling growth―which makes structural reforms harder.

　　Different manifestations of these problems can be seen across the euro zone. But the country that most dramatically epitomises all three is France. This week its embattled Socialist president, Fran?ois Hollande, was forced to reshuffle his government to eject Arnaud Montebourg who, despite being economy minister, was his own side's most persistent critic from the left (see article). Mr Hollande, who came to office in 2012 promising a painless future, is hardly a Thatcherite reformer. But since he appointed Manuel Valls as prime minister in March, he has at least embraced the principle of public-spending cuts, lower taxes and structural reforms

　　In theory a new and more cohesive reforming government could make progress, but public opinion is not remotely prepared for that. Mr Hollande is not just deeply unpopular; unlike Italy's Matteo Renzi, who has bravely made the case for (as yet undelivered) tough reforms, the French president has failed to convince voters that painful change, including a reduction in the size of the state, is inevitable. Instead, Mr Montebourg and his chums offer the beguiling notion that, if only the euro zone scraps its rules and allows bigger budget deficits and generous enough public spending, no more painful reforms will be needed, because the economy will miraculously lift itself out of danger by its own bootstraps.

　　Mr Montebourg's argument is all the more seductive because he is right about Europe's third problem: excessive austerity, largely forced on the continent by Germany. Mr Draghi has just implicitly conceded that fiscal and monetary policy in the euro zone is too tight at the annual economics jamboree in Jackson Hole. He hinted that he was in favour of quantitative easing, which both America and Britain have used, and he called for fiscal policy to do more to encourage growth―a message plainly aimed at Germany's chancellor, Angela Merkel. She is the leader who insists most firmly on sticking to the euro zone's rules on fiscal discipline, just as it is the German Bundesbank that is most strongly against quantitative easing.

　　Despite the gloom, there should be scope here for a bargain. If Mr Hollande and Mr Renzi can show they are sincere about structural reforms, Mrs Merkel should be willing to tolerate an easier fiscal stance (including higher public investment in Germany) and a looser monetary policy. Close your eyes, and you can imagine the three leaders working with the European Commission to #plete the single market and pushing through a trade deal with the United States. Sadly, in the real world, Mrs Merkel has little reason to trust either France or Italy: whenever external pressure on them has eased, they have promptly backtracked on promises of reform. And she has just installed Jean-Claude Juncker, the do-nothing candidate, as president of the European Commission.

　　So it will be hard. But without a new push from the continent's leaders, growth will not revive and deflation could take hold. Japan suffered a decade of lost growth in the 1990s, and is still struggling. But, unlike Japan, Europe is not a single cohesive country. If the currency union brings nothing but stagnation, joblessness and deflation, then some people will eventually vote to leave the euro. Thanks to Mr Draghi's promise to put a floor under government debt, the market risk that financial pressures could trigger a break-up has receded. But the political risk that one or more countries decide to storm out of the single currency is rising all the time. The euro crisis has not gone away; it is just waiting over the horizon.

　　参考译文:

　　就在几个月前，欧元区领导人坚信，经受住了这场风暴，他们最终能取得胜利。欧洲中央银行行长马里奥?德拉吉承诺无论付出多少代价都会支持欧元，德吉拉的承诺鼓舞了欧洲人民，欧洲人民的自信又回来了。经济增长似乎在恢复，尽管是以较小的步伐。通过紧急财政援助和痛苦的措施来减少财政赤字，提高竞争力，遭难的周边国家经济也在复苏。失业率，尤其在年轻人中还是相当高的，但是至少在大多数国家该比率都在下降。随着金融市场停止认为欧元会崩溃，票面利差急剧缩小。

　　这是一个错觉。最近几个星期，欧元区国家已经再一次开始吸水。他们所有GDP第二季度原地踏步：意大利彻底掉回衰退时期水平，法国GDP持平，即使是强大的德国也出人意料在出口方面大幅下降(另见文章)。第三季度的状况看起来相当不乐观，部分原因是因为欧元区会受到西方国家对俄罗斯制裁的阻力。同时，通货膨胀率降低幅度太小，只有0.4%左右，远低于欧洲中央银行的2%目标，引起了人们的恐慌，人们担心欧元区作为一个整体会成为根深蒂固通货紧缩的牺牲品。德国公债利息在1%以下徘徊，这是另一个价格下降的征兆。欧元区与英美完全相反，英美的经济正在持续增长。

　　四年多以前开始的银行业和国债危机衰退为经济增长危机，这个危机现在包围着这三大经济体。德国在经济衰退的边缘摇晃。法国陷于经济停滞的困境。意大利GDP水平只略高于15年前欧元刚出现时的水平。因为这三个国家占了欧元区总GDP的2/3，西班牙和荷兰地区的增长不能弥补他们的经济呆滞。

　　欧洲新问题的根本原因在于三个非常相似相互关联的问题。首先，缺少一个有勇气和威信的政治领导人，推动结构性改革来提高竞争力，最终重新获得增长活力：大国已经浪费了两年时间为德拉吉“无论付出多少代价”的承诺付出了代价。第二个问题是，民众不相信急切需要深入彻底的改变。第三，虽然有德拉吉的努力，货币和财政结构太紧，抑制了经济增长――这使得结构性改革更为艰难。

　　这些问题在欧元区不同地方有不同的表现。但是三个国家中最有代表性的是法国。本周，处境艰难的社会党主席弗朗索瓦?奥朗德被迫进行政府改组，以便将身为经济部长却一直是他自己的左翼阵营中最坚决的批评者的阿诺德?蒙特布尔排挤出内阁。奥朗德2012年入职，承诺会给人民带来一个美好的未来，他几乎称不上是一个撒切尔夫人的改革者。但是自从他三月任命曼纽尔瓦尔斯为首相后，他至少坚持减少政府开支、降低税收和结构性改革的原则。

　　理论上一个新的更团结的改革政府可以获得成功，但是公众舆论完全没有准备。而且这位法国总统还始终没能让选民相信，像缩减政府规模这样的痛苦的改革是无法避免的。在这一点上，意大利的马泰奥?伦齐就同奥朗德有所不同，他一直在大胆地为艰苦的改革(尽管尚未付诸行动)寻找理由。相反，蒙特布尔及其密友给出了一个具有欺骗性的概念，称只要欧元区打破规则允许更大的预算赤字和更足够的政府开支，就不需要令人痛苦的改革，因为经济会奇迹般地自己脱离险境。

　　蒙特布尔的观点更引人注目，因为他关于欧洲地第三个问题是正确的：过分的紧缩，主要在德国强迫执行。 德吉拉在杰克逊霍尔的一年一度经济学大会上含蓄地承认欧元区财政和货币政策太紧。他暗示道，他支持量化宽松，这个政策也是英美都曾使用过的，他呼吁制定更多鼓励增长的政策――这是一个明显针对德国总理安吉拉?默克尔的消息。默克尔是最坚持欧元区财政纪律的领导人，好像德国联邦银行是最强烈反对量化宽松一样。

　　虽然局势艰难，但是应该还有讨价还价的空间。如果奥朗德和里兹能证明他们对结构性改革的真诚，默克尔可能愿意容忍更宽松的财政观点(包括在德国更高的公共投资)以及更宽松的货币政策。闭上眼睛，你能想像三位领导人和欧洲委员会共同努力完成单一市场，完成和美国的贸易协定。伤感的是，在现实世界里，默克尔没有理由相信法国和意大利：只要外部压力一松懈，他们立刻就会收回改革的承诺。而且她刚刚任命无所作为的珍-克劳德客容为欧洲委员会会长。

　　所以，这会很难。但是没有州领导人新的推动，增长不会复苏，通货紧缩会持续。日本在20世纪90年代曾遭受十年的增长缓滞，而且现在还在努力。但是，不同于日本，欧洲不是结合在一起的一个国家。如果货币联盟只带来经济停滞、失业和通货紧缩，有人最终会投票离开该联盟。多亏了德拉吉承诺支撑着政府负债，财政压力会导致解体的市场危机减弱了。但是一个或多个国家决定冲出单一货币的政治危险一直在上升。欧元危机还没有离开，它只是在地平线上等着而已。